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1. Introduction 
-----------
The claim of this book is that many issues may be put into a new 
light if we analyse them with explicit attention to the role of ideals. The 
relation between law and morality is one of these themes; indeed, my 
claim is that we will not only be able to understand the debate between 
natural law theory and legal positivism better, but also to construct a 
defensible third theory. 
In recent decades, the debate between natural law theory and legal 
positivism has lost most of its sharp edges. Some authors, most notably 
Ronald Dworkin, construct intermediate positions, which are explicitly 
referred to as a third theory of law. Various authors have tried to modify 
positivism and include crucial insights from the Dworkinian criticisms, 
using phrases such as soft or inclusive positivism. Modem natural law 
theorists similarly present highly attenuated forms of the old strong 
positions. However, as critics are eager to point out, these intermediate 
positions and weaker forms of positivism and natural law also remain 
quite unsatisfactory, often even much more so than the traditional views. 
Moreover, as a result of these minor and major modifications, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to understand what the debate is all about -
is there still a genuine disagreement? 
It seems time for a fresh start. The debate has, in my view, been led 
onto the wrong track because neither .side so far explicitly recognised 
that law is an essentially ambiguous concept. Once we understand the 
essential ambiguity, we may be able to comprehend not only some of the 
misunderstandings in the debate, but also why attempts to create a 
coherent third position have failed so far. The recognition of the essen-
I would like to thank the other members of the research group on ideals, especially 
Marc Hertogh, Bertjan Wolthuis and Sanne Taekema, for their helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this paper, as well as Hildegard Penn for her meticulous care in 
correcting and improving my English. 
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tial ambiguity of law is a first step out of the deadlock, but in itself it is 
not enough to construct a third theory oflaw. In order to do so, we must 
take a second step and recognise the crucial role of ideals in law as 
sources for both the autonomy and the openness oflaw. 
I will start by elaborating the thesis of the essential ambiguity in the 
concept oflaw. We may distinguish two models of law, which cannot be 
reduced to each other and which are mutually incompatible, yet com-
plementary. I call them the practice model and the product model (sec-
tion 2). The practice model is the more dynamic model and the product 
model the more static one. Nevertheless, there is also potential for dyna-
mics in the product model. This potential can primarily be found in 
ideals (section 3). The debate between natural law and legal positivism 
may be reconstructed in terms of the two models; if we do so, we see 
that both positions embody an important insight, but also have a blind 
spot for the most important insight of the other position (section 4). If 
we combine this with the role of ideals in law, we can develop a third, 
defensible though not coherent, interactionist position (section 5). 
2. The Essential Ambiguity of Law 
That law is a controversial or even an essentially contested concept, 
is not a new insight. Many textbooks on legal philosophy or sociology 
begin with this remark. However, I want to make a claim which goes 
beyond this: law (and a similar point can be made with regard to moral-
ity) is an essentially ambiguous concept. It is not merely that we quarrel 
about the characteristics of law, the difference goes deeper: there are 
different perspectives on law, and different, partly incompatible, ways to 
modellaw.2 
Law is a highly complex phenomenon which is difficult to get a 
good grip on. It does not exist separate from society; on the contrary, it 
is an intrinsic part thereof. Of course, there are clearly identifiable legal 
procedures and institutions, such as legislation and adjudication, and 
there are clearly identifiable products, such as statutes and verdicts, but 
these are merely the most visible parts of the law. Law is like a mush-
room: the most important and enduring part of that organism is hardly 
visible as it is an underground network which may stretch beneath a 
large surface and which cannot be separated from the soil. The visible 
For a more elaborate discussion of these two models, see my 'Two Models of Law 
and Morality', Associations 3 (1999), 61-82. Lon L. Fuller (The Morality of Law, 
New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1969, pp. 106 and 118-122), makes a 
similar distinction between law as a purposive enterprise and the legal system as its 
product. 
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mushroom is the product of the organism and cannot live without it. A 
legal scholar who only studies the official law made by the legislature 
and the judiciary is like a biologist who only studies the visible mush-
room and ignores everything underground. · 
To study law, we have two models at our disposal: the product model 
and the practice model. Each has its advantages and limitations; each 
makes it possible for us to understand phenomena that we cannot fully 
grasp in the other model. Because law is self-reflexive and the result of 
human interaction, these models are not merely descriptive - they are 
also models that structure law. In legal practices, we construe law in 
specific ways, implicitly using either of the two models or trying to 
combine elements of both. Consequently, the choice of either of the two 
models has not only academic, but also practical implications. 
The product model can be called 'law in books' only in a meta-
phorical way, because it is common though not necessary that it is put 
on paper. In this model, we focus on law as a system of normative 
propositions such as 'Thou shalt not steal' (or as a collection of texts in 
which these propositions may be found). But these propositions are not 
the law (even though we often treat them as if they are); they are merely 
attempts to put the law into words. Legislators do this in statutes, judges 
in verdicts, legal scholars in their textbooks by constructing the law as a 
system of rules and principles, as a more or less coherent doctrine. And 
citizens do it too, for example, when they state that it is not allowed to 
park somewhere. I suggest the name 'law as a product' for this model. 
The propositions and texts are the product of human activity, and once 
produced, they get an existence of their own separate from the action 
from which they emerged and thus become more easily identifiable. We 
can go to the library to study legal texts, we may discuss whether a 
certain formulation of a legal rule is correct or whether it is unjust and 
perhaps should be changed. Even if we can find the law in statute books, 
iii the end we must always remain aware that law is not something we 
find, but something we construct. 
The practice model focuses on law as an interaction or as a dimen-
sion of interaction.3 Usually, law is merely an implicit dimension of our 
actions; it constitutes part of their meaning or makes them possible. 
When we buy something, it is the implicit legal dimension which makes 
this a meaningful exchange. Driving a car in heavy city traffic is only 
possible because of reasonable mutual expectations about the traffic 
The perspective offered by this practice model makes it possible for legal scholars to 
study phenomena such as living law (Ehrlich), implicit law (Fuller) and emergent or 
incipient law (Selznick). In a product model, these phenomena are difficult to under-
stand, and will at best be regarded as some deficient or underdeveloped form oflaw. 
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norms regulating our actions. Only in some specific practices such as 
adjudication we take a 'legal point of view': we formulate the implicit 
legal dimension explicitly and make it the subject of discussion, applica-
tion and change. Again, these actions and practices are not the law but 
they cannot be understood without their legal dimension. The activities 
involved are diverse. They may be distinctively legal ones such as court 
room proceedings, but also activities such as buying (or stealing) a 
bread from the baker's. In some practices, the law is implicitly applied 
and (re)created as a matter of customary law, in others the content of the 
law is explicitly debated and may be changed, for example in legislation 
and adjudication. The model of law as a practice is, therefore, connected 
with the recognition that there may be many legal practices as well as 
practices with legal dimensions, in other words with the recognition of 
legal pluralism. 4 Hence, law as a dimension of our interaction is much 
less tangible than law as a product, and it is much more difficult to give 
a stipulative definition, let alone a demarcation of it. 5 
Law can thus be regarded both as a dimension· of interaction and the 
product of that interaction. These two models are not separate realities. 
They refer to each otb.er, presuppose each other and complement each 
other. Legal rules are the product of distinctively legal subpractices and 
of the broader interaction in society. Statutes and case law are the 
product of the legal practices of legislation and adjudication. Legal 
doctrine is (at least in some legal systems like the Netherlands) the 
product of the academic legal practice. Conversely, social reality is 
influenced in many ways by law as a product. Citizens' actions are part-
ly determined by rules as they are formulated in statutes, by judgments 
which order them to do or endure something and by the ideas that citi-
zens themselves construct about the demands 'the law' implies for them. 
Moreover, they are oriented towards law as a product because the pro-
duction of statutes or judgments is the main purpose of some subprac-
tices. A similar interdependence may be found in theories about law: as 
On the connection between an interactionist approach to law and the recognition of 
legal pluralism, see Fuller, Morality of Law, pp. 123-129; Philippe Nonet and Philip 
Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law, New York, 
Harper; 1978, pp. 95-1 03. 
I will not try to give a definition here, because the model as such is neutral and may 
be combined with a variety of definitions. Most of the available definitions based on 
a practice view focus primarily on one of the explicitly legal practices, such as legis-
lation or adjudication, and ignore the implicit legal dimensions of other practices. Cf. 
Fuller for legislation: 'the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance 
ofru1es'; and Dworkin for adjudication and academic legal practice; 'an argumenta-
tive and interpretative practice'. 
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I will discuss below, most sophisticated theorists have tried to combine 
insights from the two models. 
But even if the two models are not separable, they cannot be reduced 
to each other either. It is like physical models of electrons. The latter 
may be modelled as small particles or as waves. Each model allows us 
to understand certain phenomena satisfactorily, which cannot be ex-
plained in the other model. We may translate many ideas from the wave 
model into the particle model and vice versa, but usually there will be 
some loss of meaning and elegance. Every attempt to understand elec-
trons merely in terms of one of the two models will lead to partial and 
incomplete theories. To get a full understanding of electrons, we must 
alternate between the two models. 
Analogously, there are different ways to understand law and to 
model it. Depending on the context and the purposes of our involvement 
with law, we should choose one or the other. For a full understanding of 
law, we should continuously switch between the two models: This is 
why law is not merely an essentially contested concept, but an essen-
tially ambiguous one. It is not merely that every conception of law will 
always be contested as in the continuing debate on the conceptions 
suggested by authors like Fuller, Hart and Dworkin. We are forced to 
accept a more radical and perhaps disquieting thesis: Every attempt to 
construct one coherent conception is intrinsically flawed because the 
two models are not fully compatible, yet both hold parts of the truth. 
3. The Dynamics of Law 
The distinction between the two models is especially illuminating 
when we focus on the phenomenon of change. Law is in a process of 
continuous change, just like society· in general. Statutes are changed 
sometimes quite radically, sometimes only in minor ways; case law 
usually develops through smaller steps and so does the implicit law 
regulating commercial practice or medical practice. Changes in legisla-
tion and case law may be the most explicit, but are certainly not the only 
ones. 
The question is: How can we understand and explain these changes? 
The obvious answer is to take an external point of view and analyse the 
way in which the law changes as a result of social, economic and politi-
cal developments. But even if this is an important part of the answer, it 
is still only part thereof. We should also look for the potential for 
change inherent in law itself If there were no such potential, it would be 
much more difficult for external forces to change the law, as law is at 
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least a partly autonomous institution, and is not merely a completely · 
malleable instrument of social and political forces. 6 
The two models are clearly different with regard to change. Law as a 
practice is a dynamic model, whereas law as a product focuses on the 
static side of law. It is therefore not difficult to identify the potential for 
change when we take a practice perspective. It is obvious that law can 
be changed in processes of explicit lawmaking, such as legislation and 
adjudication. Similarly, the law changes when doctors discuss euthana-
sia and practise it, and gradually develop criteria for whether and when 
it may be considered part of good medical practice. In those practices 
where law is merely an implicit dimension of interaction, there is a 
potential for change in the fact that each new interaction implies a 
recreation of the implicit legal norms. 7 Even if this recreation usually is 
the mere application and reinforcement of these norms, application of 
norms is never purely mechanical and always involves a creative act in 
which these norms are slightly altered. 
In the practice model, the potential for change is thus easy to iden-
tify. What exactly these changes involve, however, can be better under-
stood within the context of the product model. In the practice model, we 
can discern changes in interaction patterns or observe that parliament 
has passed a new statute. To determine more in detail what these 
changes imply, we should discuss them in terms oflegal texts, doctrines 
or statements of positive law. But positive law is not merely the passive 
result of changes in legal practices. It has a logic of its own, inherent 
possibilities and limitations. If there were no potential for change in law 
as a product, it would be much more difficult to change it. Therefore, we 
should also look at the legal doctrine, this supposedly more static di-
. mension of law, and determine where its potential for further develop-
ment lies. This may seem a curious idea. Legal doctrine is often pre-
sented in legal textbooks in an ahistorical way, as a coherent system of 
rules and concepts. Even if it is admitted that there are small gaps and 
Alan Watson (The Evolution of Law, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1985) argues that legal development is mainly determined by the resources and 
limitations inherent in the legal culture and tradition; societal needs and influences 
only play a minor role. His statement may be too strong, especially for the modern 
regulatory state, but he is certainly right in emphasising the importance of inherent 
resources for change. 
Cf. Eugen EhTlich's famous dictum in the Foreword to Fundamental Principles ~f 
the Sociology of Law, New Brunswick and London, Transaction Publishers, 2002; 
orig. English transl. 1936, orig. 1913, p. lix: 'The center of gravity oflegal develop-
ment lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in judicial decision, but in so-
ciety itself.' 
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minor inconsistencies, these can be solved in line with this general 
system of rules. In such an approach, major changes seem impossible. 
Law may work itself pure, but it cannot transform itself in more radical 
ways. 
Obviously, this image of limited change does not do justice to real-
ity. Positive law changes in many ways, and not only via legislation. For 
example, the judiciary obviously changes the law - sometimes very 
radically- even if in most legal systems there is an ideology that tries to 
minimise the creative impact of their interventions. What are the sources 
that the judges can appeal to to· change the existing view of law? 
Usually, the reason to change the law is that new concrete problems 
or more general issues arise for which the legal doctrine either offers no 
clear solution or suggests a solution that is inadequate. This may be the 
reason why a change of law is required, but it is not a resource for the 
change. The resource is to be found rather at the other end of abstrac-
tion, at the level of purposes, principles and ideals. 8 When confronted 
with issues regarding HIV tests or information technology, basic notions 
such as privacy or autonomy provide guidance and inspiration. Not only 
that, however; we also see new d.imensions of those old notions. That 
autonomy may also be relevanf with respect to information connected 
with one's personality, such as HIV status or even consumer patterns is 
something new - a new dimension of the old concepts of autonomy and 
privacy. The ideals behind those concepts may provide inspiration for 
dealing with new cases.9 Only in the light of new cases, we see the 
inadequacy of the current legal doctrine and find recourse to the poten-
tial for change implicit in the ideals with their surplus of meaning. 
In this way, ideals provide a source of inspiration for change. The 
need for change lies elsewhere, outside the doctrine, in new cases and 
The idea that principles play a major role in legal development is not uncommon; the 
modem classic being R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1978. The idea, however, that ideals and purposes also 
play such a role is perhaps less standard, but has been suggested by various authors 
including Fuller, Morality of Law; Nonet and Selznick, Law and Society in Transi-
tion; Dworkin, Law's Empire, Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1986; A.A.G. Peters, 'Law as Critical Discussion', in G. Teubner 
(ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1986, pp. 250-279. 
Cf. Nonet and Selznick, Law and Society in Transition, p. 81: 'When Fuller under-
scores the centrality of purpose in the legal enterprise or when Dworkin and Hughes 
look to principle and policy as foundations of legal reasoning, they express the mod-
em aspiration for a legal order that is effective in dealing with change.' 
That abstract ideals need not always be the best possible guide, especially not when 
they are cut loose from their basis in legal and empirical reality, is nicely illustrated 
by Peter Blok's contribution to this volume. 
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issues. But the resources to develop new ideas which may help to deal 
with these new cases and issues are to be found in ideals. Ideals are, of 
course, not the only resource - imaginative thinking may, for example, 
also be inspired by moral theories or even by literature and art and may 
borrow from other legal systems. 10 But because ideals - and the con-
nected principles and purposes - not only have a surplus of meaning, 
but (in any case the legal ideals I discuss here) are also part of the law 
itself and thus share its authority, they are the first resource to turn to 
when we need internal change. 
These ideals may sometimes be codified, directly or indirectly but 
never completely. The ideals of legality, legal certainty or justice them-
selves are not codified in Dutch law, but some more specific implica-
tions in the form of the principle of legality (Article 1 Dutch Penal 
Code) and the principle of equality (Article 1 Dutch Constitution) have 
been laid down. Even if these slightly more specific principles are codi-
fied, it does not mean that their meaning is unambiguous and uncontro-
versial. On the contrary, these principles are essentially contested, and 
their interpretation is open to development. This is because their 
meaning can only be determined in the light of both the context and the 
underlying ideals with their surplus of meaning. A good example of the 
way in which the codification of ideals and principles may give rise to a 
continuous evolution of positive law can be found in the European Con-
vention of Human Rights, discussed in the Introduction to this volume. 
In the product model, ideals (and principles and purposes) thus pro-
vide a source for change in the legal doctrine. 11 When the provisional 
equilibrium of legal doctrine is disturbed by new problematic cases or 
more general issues, they may offer guidance .and orientation for revi-
sion of the doctrine. However, because they do not offer clear and 
unambiguous answers and always need to be interpreted, when we do 
appeal to ideals we are forced to leave the safety and certainty of estab-
lished legal doctrine and enter a practice of normative argument about 
1° For the influence of ethical analysis on health law (and vice versa), see my 'Bioethics 
and Law: A Developmental Perspective', Bioethics (1997), 91-114; for inspiration 
by literature, see Martha Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and 
the Public Life, Boston, Beacon Press, 1995; for influences by other legal systems, 
see Watson, Evolution of Law. 
11 I merely identify the potential for change in ideals in general terms here. The ques-
tions when and why participants in the legal practice will indeed appeal to ideals, to 
which ideals an appeal is made and whether this appeal to ideals is successful, cannot 
yet be discussed in such general terms because there are too many relevant variables. 
Some of the case studies in this volume shed light on these issues, but of course, they 
do not add up to a general theory yet. 
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the best possible solutions of the concrete cases or the legal approach to 
more general issues in the light of those ideals. To determine the impli-
cations of the general ideals and principles, to elaborate a revised legal 
doctrine and construct solutions to new cases, we have to participate in 
law as an argumentative practice. 12 
In discussions, ideals may provide a common frame of reference. 
They are a common starting point in a pluralist practice. They can be 
catalysts in promoting an open debate. Such a debate may lead to legal 
change, through judicial interpretation and legislative action, but also 
because it results in shifting interpretations by society or by specific 
sectors or professions. The surplus of meaning and the fact that they will 
never be completely realised even if they are at least partly realised in 
law, makes different interpretations possible of what the underlying 
ideals imply for the societal problems we are confronted with, and what 
would be the best way to realise them more fully. 13 
Ideals thus play a role in both models. In the product model, they are 
authoritative sources within the legal doctrine that provide inspiration 
and guidance for reconstructing the doctrine. In the practice model, they 
offer a frame of reference for discussion, reflection and action. They do 
not, however, only play a role in the separate models, but also in the 
continuous interaction between the two models in the social reality of 
law. 
Once we appeal to them in order to provide answers for hard cases 
for which the present legal doctrine is inadequate, they promote a switch 
from the product to the practice model. We are forced to leave settled 
doctrine and reopen the debate about the construction of the doctrine, of 
law as a product. In fact, lawyers do this continuously when they apply 
statutes, construct contracts and wills, argue a case in court and so on. In 
all such cases, they participate in legal practices and reconstruct legal 
doctrine. However, the orientation towards ideals makes them do this 
more explicitly, because they bring a clear source of ambiguity and 
controversy into the practice which cannot be ignored. Whereas lawyers 
usually construct the doctrine and the various products based thereon as 
unambiguous and uncontroversial, as settled positive law, the appeal to 
ideals unsettles this and makes an open discussion about the content of 
the legal doctrine unavoidable. The openness of ideals leaves room for 
12 C[, Dworkin, Law's Empire, p. 14; Peters, 'Law as Critical Discussion'. 
13 We should beware of a simple instrumentalist view of the relation between these 
ideals and the means. For a good analysis of the dialectic relationship between means 
and ends, see Pauline Westerman, 'Means and Ends', in Willem J. Witteveen and 
Wibren van der Burg (eds.), Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Insti-
tutional Design, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 1999, pp. 145-168. 
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multiple interpretations and these should be confronted in the discursive 
practices of law. 14 
When we participate in the various practices that creatively interpret, 
reconstruct and discuss the law, we cannot go on debating forever. It is 
essential that law also provides proVisional closures. As · Selznick has 
argued throughout his work, we cannot understand law unless we 
recognise the leading ideals of the practice. Among the leading ideals of 
law is legal certainty. 15 This ideal influences the practice of law. It 
reminds us that we cannot debate forever, and reorients us to law as a 
product. Law is most effective when it is clearly formulated, when there 
is a provisionally settled doctrine, or an authoritative judicial decision or 
a contract about our legal obligations. Only if we attempt to formulate 
rules and principles, law can help us orient our behaviour and offer 
solutions for concrete problematic cases. Therefore, we must try to 
reformulate the law, to reconstruct the doctrine; to make verdicts and 
contracts. There may be a continuous debate about the construction of 
the law, but this debate should also lead to provisional closures, by 
legislatures enacting a statute, by judges pronouncing a judgment and by 
legal scholars formulating a legal doctrine. 
So, we switch continuously between the two models. The distinc-
tively legal ideal of legal certainty forces us to reconstruct the legal 
·doctrine and bring the debate to a provisional closure. On the other 
hand, the same ideals as well as other ideals open legal doctrine to 
internal criticism, and offer inspiration and guidance for revision. There 
is thus a dialectical relationship between the two models, which opens 
the way to legal change without destabilising the law completely. In this 
dialectical process, ideals provide a bridge between the two models. 
They force us to open and then again to provisionally close the legal 
doctrine, thus keeping the change within acceptable limits. 
We may conclude that ideals promote the dynamics of law in various. 
ways. First, they offer a potential for ideas, for new principles and 
practical solutions when the existing doctrine needs revision. Second, 
they force us to leave the certainty of legal doctrine and enter an explic-
14 Of course, sometimes the debate will end by an authoritative conclusion, e.g., by a 
judge, ignoring this pluralism, before the debate bas really started. 
15 See Sanne Taekema, The Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory, The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 2003, pp. 158-166. Selznick suggests that there is only one master 
ideal in law, legality. Taekema, however, has argued convincingly in favour of a plu-
rality of leading ideals or core ideals as well as a plurality of other ideals which are 
not distinctively legal. See G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, Sste Aufl., Hrsg. von 
E. Wolfund H.-P. Schneider, Stuttgart, K.F. Koehler, 1973, for the suggestion that 
legal certainty is one of those ideals. 
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itly argumentative practice. Third, they provide a common frame of 
reference in the ensuing discussion. And fmally, they stimulate us to 
reach at least provisional conclusions. 
4. The Debate between Natural Law and Legal Positivism 
The distinction between the two models is helpful for a better under-
standing of the debate between natural law and legal positivism. This 
debate is quite confused; in fact, it is often not clear what exactly the 
debate is about. In its most general form, we can say that it is about the 
separation between law and morals. Positivists hold some version of the 
thesis that such a separation is possible, natural law theorists that it is 
not. However, there are many different versions of this thesis and its 
counterpart. 16 Taekema makes a distinction between the thesis that the 
concept of law is morally neutral and the thesis that the content of law 
need not necessarily meet certain demands. 17 If, for example, as external 
observers we define law as a system of rules that have been officially 
recognised by the sovereign, we use a positivist, morally neutral concept 
of law. If, as participants in judicial proceedings, we argue that a se-
verely unjust statute that violates basic moral tenets is nevertheless valid 
law, we appeal to a positivist view of the content of law. I need not go 
into the details and merits of the various versions here, because my 
contention is a general one. The debate, and especially the numerous 
misunderstandings and the apparent futility of the attempts by parties in 
the debate to convince each other, can be better understood in terms of 
the two models. 
If we hold a product model of law, it seems easy to construct the 
concept of law in such a way that the separation is true - in either of its 
versions. We may, for example, define law as the complete set of nor-
mative propositions that are valid because of some institutional test, or 
because they have been stated authoritatively by some specified sources. 
We may claim that both in the concept of law and in the content of law 
there is no necessary connection to morality. In such a concept of law 
and in such a view of the way in which the content of the law can be 
determined, positivism is true. However, it is only true by stipulation, by 
construction, because we have constructed law in a specific way first. 18 
Only because the constructive element in law as a product is .so often 
16 For a discussion, see David Lyons, Moral Aspects of Legal Theory, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 70 f.; Van der Burg, 'Two Models'; 
Taekema, Concept of/deals, ch. 8. 
17 Taekema, Concept of/deals, pp. 176-177. 
18 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 47. 
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neglected and because we act as if law is an objective social fact that 
can be found in social reality, independent of the way in which we 
constructed this reality in the first place, may we believe otherwise. 
Positivists often argue as if their thesis is a general truth corroborated by 
the facts of life, but this is an illusion. The separation of law and morals 
only exists in the eye of the beholder, who ignores that law is the prod-
uct of our construction. 
Still, this is not the death blow to legal positivism. Recognising that 
it is only the result of our human construction need not invalidate it. It 
can still be the best possible construction. And orthodox legal positivism 
has some obvious advantages, such as simplicity and offering a high 
degree oflegal certainty (and thus, indirectly, freedom). 19 
On the other side of the debate, natural law theorists criticise the 
separation thesis. 20 In terms of the product model, they claim, first, that 
there is some objective morality and, second, that there is some neces-
sary connection between objective moral truths and law. Both of these 
theses are problematic but need not be indefensible. The idea that there 
is some objective morality, a moral natural law, may be less popular 
than it used to be; but the project is, especially in some weaker forms, 
certainly not completely abandoned. Although I do not believe this 
project can be successful, I will focus on the strengths and flaws of the 
second thesis. 
Just like in the case of positivism, we can easily construct our con-
cept of law and our idea of how to determine the contents of law in such 
a way that the second thesis is true by stipulation. If we want to stipulate 
that some officially declared rules may only be considered law if they 
have some minimal content of moral natural law, ours is an easy victory 
if we henceforth conclude that there is some necessary connection 
between law and morality. In fact, most modem legal systems have 
partly included this as a criterion of the content of law, by the accep-
tance of human rights treaties and human rights clauses in their constitu-
tions. But again, this is too easy a victory for natural law, as it wins only 
by stipulation. 
It seems, therefore, that both parties can easily defend their positions 
by holding on to their implicit stipulations and then accuse the other of 
not meeting the criteria stipulated. The way out of this deadlock is, I 
19 For a similar point see Dworkin's reply to 'Soper-Lyons positivism' in which he 
states that this type of positivism loses the traditional advantages claimed by positiv-
ism; Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 346-349. 
20 With 'natural law' I refer to the classical natural law thinkers and modem authors 
such as Finnis, not to authors such as Dworkin, Radbruch, Selznick or Fuller. 
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suggest, to leave the product model. We should accept that the concept 
of law and the conception of how to determine its content are con-
structed ideas, constructed in the practice that we call law in the more 
general sense and in the more restricted practice oflegal scholarship. As 
long as we restrict ourselves to the model of law as a product without 
acknowledging its constructive character, the debate will never be won 
or lost, as both parties can continue to defend their views successfully. 
In order to go beyond this stalemate, we need to enter the field of legal 
practice, and acknowledge the element of construction both in the law 
itself and in our theories oflaw. 
We should therefore try to rephrase the debate between natural law 
and legal positivism in constructivist terms. How are we going to decide 
which party has the better argument? I suggest we should choose that 
position which fits best with what we do in legal practice and which is 
also the best defensible one from a philosophical point ofview.21 
If we look at law as a practice, the conclusion can only be that both 
sides fail. Positivism fails, as both Fuller and Dworkin have convinc-
ingly argued, because law as a practice cannot be separated from moral-
ity. I take the critical edge of both Fuller and Dworkin to be that they 
focus on law as a practice rather than on law as a product. Dworkin's 
main poirit is that law is an interpretative and argumentative practice, 
and that in this practice we cannot separate moral and political argu-
ments. (In fact, Dworkin focuses only on one legal practice, that of 
adjudication, but a similar point may be made with regard to various 
other legal practices, such as legal scholarship and implicit law.) Fuller, 
focusing on law-making, regards law as the enterprise of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules, and holds that ifwe want to 
do this successfully, we need to respect the internal morality of law. 
These two theses can be generalised to conclude that in legal practice a 
full separation of law and its internal morality is impossible. In general 
practices where the legal is merely a dimension of interaction, an even 
stronger point can be made, namely that the moral and legal dimensions 
are intertwined. In the implicit understandings of our contractual obliga-
tions, the meaning of contractual terms and legal rules regulating them 
will usually be infused with moral notions of fairness and equity. 
However, this failure of positivism in the light of the facts does not 
· imply that natural law wins. In law as a practice, we aim at the best 
21 Cf. Dworkin's criteria of fit and political morality for acceptance of a legal theory; 
see Matter of Principle, p. 143. Although he develops these criteria for the question 
whether we should accept a theory as an interpretation of the law of a certain juris-
diction at a certain time, similar criteria may also be used for the question whether 
we should accept a theory as an interpretation of the phenomenon oflaw in general. 
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political morality, but we also know that this aim can never be fully 
achieved. Even if we could uphold the ontological claim that there is an 
objective morality, there is still the unsurmountable problem of how to 
know it. Pervasive moral pluralism is a fact of life in our modem socie-
ties. The core of truth in natural law is that a legal practice is inherently 
connected with morality, with underlying values and normative ideas 
about what the law should be. Law has a partly moral character. But this 
does not imply that this moral character is connected with some objec-
tive morality. It does not even imply that it is connected with one right 
answer. We should aim at the best possible answer, but a realistic analy-
sis of our practices shows that there are usually strong conflicts between 
the values at stake and their interpretations. Moreover, even if Dworkin 
is right in arguing that each individual participant aims at the best 
possible answer, this does not imply that the practice as such also aims 
at the best possible answer. Pluralism in the legal practice is so perva-
sive and deep that the best a practice can hope for is a plurality of 
legitimate answers from which may be chosen in many legitimate ways, 
both by judges and by other participants in the practice.22 
The conclusion is 1;hat the debate between legal positivism and natu-
ral law is a debate within the context of law as a product, in which both 
sides defend positions which at least prima facie may seem defensible 
within that context as long as one makes the correct stipulations. How-
ever, it is mainly a non-debate because - at least when entering the 
discussion - both parties tend to ignore the constructive element and 
present it as a debate about what the law is rather than as a debate about 
how it can best be constructed. 
If we reconstruct the two views as competing claims about the best 
possible construction of law, both prove to have fatal flaws. Both theo-
ries have one weakness in common: they cannot adequately cope with 
legal change. Roger Cotterrell presents this as a criticism of positivism, 
but it can equally be brought forward against natural law theories.23 This 
weakness is the result of a one-sided focus on the product model that is 
characteristic of (at least the orthodox versions of) both theories. More-
over, legal positivism is unable to do justice to the idea that our legal 
practice is inherently connected with morality in various ways.24 Natural 
· 
22 See also Taekema, Concept of Ideals, pp. 189-190; Jeremy Waldron, Law and 
Disagreement, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999, pp. 164-187. 
23 Cf. Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal 
Philosophy, London and Edinburgh, ButteiWorths, 1989, p. 127. 
24 Except for fonns of soft positivism or inclusive positivism. However, these versions 
have flaws of their own into which I cannot go here. See Taekema, Concept of Ideals, 
pp. 188-189, for the argument that these positions are internally inconsistent and 
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law has two flaws connected with its two central theses. It has proven 
difficult, if not impossible,. to establish convincing arguments in favour 
of an objective ethical theory- just like the law, our morality is a prod-
uct of our own construction.25 As a consequence, there are no convinc-
ing arguments about the necessary objective moral basis of the law. 
Even if this philosophical problem of establishing an objective ethical 
theory could be tackled, an empirical problem would still remain: it does 
not do justice to the fact of pluralism. Our legal practice is partly moral 
in character, yet this morality is not connected With one right answer or 
with some objective morality, but rather with a plurality of moralities. 
Natural law seems unaware of the essentially contested character of the 
moral dimension of our legal practice. 
The distinction between the two models of law can thus clarify the 
debate between natural law and legal positivism.26 It illuminates both 
why the positions can be successfully defended in the context of the 
product model and why they fall short in the practice model. This leaves 
us with the question how to construct a third alternative, a theory of law 
which can do justice to both models. In order to construct such an 
alten;tative, we should return to the. role of ideals in law. 
5. An Interactionist Perspective 
Partly in line with Ronald Dworkin's view, I have argued that in as 
far as ideals and principles are part of legal doctrine, they force us to 
question settled legal doctrine and open it for normative discussion. In 
such a normative discussion, political, moral and legal arguments cannot 
Dworkin; Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 345-350, for the argument that they have lost 
most of the attractiveness of orthodox positivism. 
25 See Taekema, Concept of Ideals, p. 189. This criticism ·does not imply a relativist 
position, but is consistent with a pragmatist view. See my 'Dynamic Ethics', Journal 
of Value Inquiry 37 (2003), 13-34. 
26 I have greatly simplified the positions of natural law and legal positivism. Every 
sophisticated legal theory has tried to combine insights from both models. Even if the 
focus of both natural law and. legal positivism is on the product model, they have also 
tried to integrate elements from the practice model. For example, H.L.A. Hart called 
his own theory a 'practice theory of law' (in the Postscript to The Concept of Law, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 255); his theory starts with the practice model, by 
analysing rules in terms of rule-following behaviour. However, when it comes to de-
fending his views against those of Fuller or Dworkin, the focus is on rules as linguis-
tic expressions, as normative propositions needing interpretation. For a more exten-
sive analysis of Hart's position and that of other authors in the debate, see my 'Tw~ 
Models'. 
211 
An Interactionist View on the Relation between Law and Morality 
be separated. Ronald Dworkin even speaks of a fusion of moral and 
legal theory, at least in the context of constitutional issues.27 
I believe this is overstating the point. There certainly is no complete 
.. merger of law and morals. (In fact, Dworkin himself does not support 
··such a view either.) That we cannot separate them does not mean that 
they cannot be distinguished. That the construction of legal doctrine is a 
continuous process in which political and moral arguments· are inte-
grated into the legal argument does not mean that there is no distinc-
tively legal point of view, distinctively legal practices or distinctively 
legal doctrine. 
hi modem Western societies, law has relative autonomy. It is not 
fully separate from morality and society, neither is it completely inte~ 
grated in them. This relative autonomy has its primary basis in the 
institutional dimension of law; an additional basis may be found at the 
level of ideals. Law involves a connected set of subpractices such as 
legislation and adjudication. Each of these subpractices has relative 
autonomy as a result of its specific function, its procedural and substan-
tive norms which shield it from being completely submerged in the 
larger social context and the larger moral and political arguments. 
Adjudication, for example, may be open to moral arguments, but this 
certainly does not lead to a complete fusion of moral and legal argu-
ments. On the contrary, in most Western countries, the institution is 
highly, though not completely shielded from a direct influence by 
political and moral beliefs that may dominate society. Even the legisla-
tive process does not allow a complete fusion of legal and political 
arguments, as the discretionary space of the political institutions is 
regulated by constitutional constraints, international law, by consistency 
. with the system of existing legislation or, in more general terms, by the 
';'rule of law. So the institutional setting of legal practices prevents a 
complete fusion of law, politics and morality, even if it allows substan-
tial intertwining. 
Perhaps we could imagine a legal practice in which the secondary 
rules exclude all reference to morality or politics and in which legal 
obligations are determined purely by a mechanistic appeal to formal 
rules or (when they do not apply) by procedures such as pure chance. 
Such a practice might approximate the ideal type of a complete separa-
tion between law and morality. It is, however, obvious that such prac-
tices are uncommon in modem societies. As soon as legal practices 
allow a normative discussion about the interpretation of rules and con-
cepts in order to make them fit complex situations, a strict separation 
27 Cf. Dworkin, Taldng Rights Seriously, p. 149. 
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between law and morality is impossible. That is, in my view, the central 
insight we may learn from Ronald Dworkin.28 So the reality of those 
practices, especially of the official law-making institutions, is that of 
relative autonomy.29 Moreover, legal practices are rarely separate from 
society in another way: their aim is usually to regulate non-legal prac-
tices, such as those of medicine or trade and, as a consequence, they 
have to be open to those practices and to the normative dimensions 
inherent in those dimensions.30 
This relative autonomy is reflected in legal doctrine. Dworlcin is right 
in arguing that we should not regard legal doctrine as something out 
there, as a 'brooding omnipresence in the sky', as 'existing law'; it is the 
product of our construction.31 Nevertheless, in our construction we 
distinguish between legal doctrine and moral or political views - even if 
we accept the anti-positivist truth that a strict separation is not possible. 
The legal doctrine in most modem societies includes many normative 
standards with an openness to societal views such as fairness and equity, 
it includes principles and ideals with an openness to moral theory, and 
we may have to interpret statutes in the light of the political purposes 
behind them. However, this ope,nness is not complete; a distinctively 
legal perspective still remains from which we should try to construct a 
legal doctrine. 
Both the autonomy of law and its relative character may also be un-
derstood in terms of ideals. 32 On the one hand, ideals and principles may 
form a bridge between the moral, legal and political discourses, because 
many ideals and principles are common to these discourses. If we could 
speak of a fusion of moral, legal and political theory, it would be ex-
pected at this level. Nevertheless, ideals are open to interpretation and 
get part of their meaning from the network of meanings in which they 
are embedded: the other ideals with which they are connected, the more 
specific rules and principles which can be regarded as their implementa-
tions and the institutional context in which their meaning is con-
28 Other authors have made similar points before. One of the reasons why Ronald 
Dworkin did not cause much debate in Dutch legal philosophy is that the still highly 
influential Dutch jurist Scholten already developed a similar theory of judicial inter-
pretation in 1931. See Paul Scholten, Mr. C. Asser's Handleiding tot de beoefening 
van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht: Algemeen dee/, Zwolle, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 
197 4, orig. 1931. 
29 For a more elaborate discussion see my 'Two Models', pp. 75 f. 
30 See Taekema, Concept of Ideals, pp. 167-168, for a similar argument. 
31 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 293 and 344. 
32 The following analysis is based on Taekema, Concept of Ideals, pp. 167-1 73. 
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structed. 33 This means that ideals of solidarity or privacy get a specific 
colouring depending on the context - legal, political or moral- in which 
they are discussed. There may be one common concept, but the concep-
tions differ. Although it is especially through ideals and principles that 
the legal doctrine is connected with moral and political argument, and 
although this is mainly because the same ideals are used in each of these 
contexts, the meaning of the ideals in each of the contexts is not identi-
cal. In this way, the ideals common to law, morals and politics embody a 
strong tendency to open up law to politics and morals, even if they allow 
some autonomy of law. 
On the other hand, the autonomy of law is supported by distinctively 
legal ideals. Philip Selznick' s idea of master ideals is illuminating here. 
According to Selznick, every practice is oriented towards some master 
ideal, which accounts for. its distinctive character.34 In this way, law is 
oriented towards the master ideal of legality, which Selznick interprets 
as the progressive reduction of arbitrariness. Sanne Taekema argues 
convincingly that Selznick's idea of one .and only one master ideal for 
each practice is not adequate and does not do justice to the complex 
character of practices.35 Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish some 
ideals which have a more important role for specific practices. We may 
call them the core values or central ideals of that practice. Legality 
(including legal certainty) and justice are such core values for law, and 
in this sense may be regarded as distinctively legal ideals. They are not 
exclusive to law Gustice is the first virtue of social institutions in gen-
eral, according to Rawls), nor are they the only ideals of law. Yet, they 
have a special role in the practice oflaw,just as the democratic ideal has 
a special role in the context of political institutions without being mean-
ingless in other institutions such as universities or companies. Apart 
from these ideals which are common to all legal subpractices, there may 
also be more specific legal ideals for specific subpractices or subfields 
of law. Democracy and human rights are central to constitutional law, 
and good governance to administrative law. The ideal of due process is 
just as central to the practice of adjudication as the ideal of intellectual 
integrity is central to legal scholarship. 
The orientation towards distinctively legal ideals is another ground 
for the relative autonomy of law. They are not exclusive to law, nor is 
33 Cf. Antori Vedder, 'Waarden en het web van zin en betekenis', in Wibren van der 
Burg and Frans W.A. Brom (eds.), Over idea/en: Het belang van idea/en in recht, 
rnoraal en politiek, Deventer, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willlink, 1998, pp. 39-54. 
34 Cf. Philip Selznick, 'Sociology and Natural Law', Natural Law Forum 6 (1961), 84-
108. 
35 Taekema, Concept of/deals, pp. 162-166. 
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their meaning only determined in legal discourse. Yet, the prime impor-
tance of these ideals is distinctive for law and is one reason why we may 
discern relative autonomy for the law.36 
This relative autonomy of the law is the central thesis of a third the-
ory of law, distinct from natural law and legal positivism. It is distinct 
from legal positivism because it holds that in law as a practice law and 
morality cannot be separated, whereas in law as a product a separation 
may be a choice we make in our construction but is not an essential 
· characteristic of law as such. It is distinct from natural law because it 
denies that there is any inherent moral quality in law as a practice, 
whereas in law as a product we can stipulate that law must meet certain 
moral standards, but this would make the necessary connection between 
law and morality merely true by stipulation. 
This third theory may be named interactionist, because interaction is 
central to it in various respects. It regards law both as a practice of 
human interaction (and as a dimension of practices) and as a product of 
human interaction.37 Moreover, it accepts that law, with its relative 
autonomy, can only exist in a continuing process of interaction with 
morality and politics, and with society at large. Law cannot be separated 
from morality, nor can it be completely fused with morality. The content 
of the law cannot be determined without any appeal to moral or political 
arguments, yet it maintains relative autonomy as regards those argu-
ments by only selectively incorporating them in the law and by trans-
forming them during the process. 
The claim of a third theory of law is, of course, not new. Many legal 
theorists have claimed to provide such a third theory oflaw or have been 
classified by others as doing so. It is helpful to analyse why their at-
tempts to construCt a coherent third theory of law have failed, and 
especially why these have often led to such obvious inconsistencies or 
vagueness. Both Fuller and Dworkin, to mention only two authors 
whose work has been characterised as a third theory of law (and whose 
work obviously is a source of inspiration for the approach I propose), 
have often been accused, and rightly so, that their theories contain many 
inconsistencies and unsolved ambiguities. Whereas the two traditional 
parties, natural law and legal positivism, can, in different versions, be 
36 Taekema, Concept of/deals, pp. 203-204. 
37 Interactionism in a minimal sense might be interpreted as the idea that law is a 
practice of human interaction. I defend a richer form of interactionism here, because 
I add that it may also be regarded as the product of that interaction, and that we can-
not separate practice and product. 
215 
An Interactionist View on the Relation between Law and Morality 
. presented as relatively consistent and defensible theories, this has 
proven to be much more problematic with third theories oflaw.38 
My suggestion is that the reason why all these third theories fail is 
that they try to do justice to the valuable insights we can gain by 
combining the two models, yet fail to recognise their incommensura-
bility. The example of Dworkin is illustrative. In Taking Rights Serious-
ly, he developed convincing arguments against various versions of legal 
positivism. In this early work, he switched between two lines of argu-
ment. One was internal to the product model, arguing that law was more 
than a body of rules, and that the inclusion of principles in legal doc-
trine, with their open and contested character, made a simple pedigree 
test impossible. The other was based on the idea of law as an argumen-
tative practice, in which we should explicitly recognise the constructive 
character of legal doctrine. As his many critics were eager to point out, 
the combination of the two lines led to many inconsistencies and 
ambiguities. In subsequent books, especially Law's Empire, Dworkin 
tried to respond to these critics and elaborate a coherent theory of law. 
However, what he won in consistency in this book, he lost in convin-
cingness, because he was forced to skip insights which did not fit into 
this one coherent theory, yet were initially crucial to his critical project. 
If my suggestion is correct that we need both models but that they 
are incommensurable, we have to accept that one coherent theory is 
impossible. We are bound to end up with theories in which inconsisten-
cies and ambiguities are unavoidable. Of course, this idea seems, at least 
· . at first sight, unacceptable to most legal scholars, especially in as far as 
they have undergone the influence of analytical philosophy. Weeding 
out inconsistencies and ambiguities seems one of the central methodolo-
gical requirements of good scholarship. Openly accepting them seems 
like declaring the breakdown of academic research. · 
Therefore it is quite understandable that, in the end, almost every au-
thor aiming at a third theory of law presented his theory in such a way 
that it was either easily reducible to one of the traditional alternatives or 
easily criticisable by both parties as not doing justice to reality. If they 
wanted to be consistent, they paid the price of not doing justice to the 
complexities of reality. If they wanted to do justice to reality, they ended 
up with a theory full of fatal inconsistencies and ambiguities or with a 
theory which only consisted in a programme and some loosely con-
nected fragments. It seems to me that Ronald Dworkin's development 
38 The internal inconsistency of inclusive positivism, an attempt to integrate some 
insights of anti-positivist authors such as Dworkin into positivism, is another exam-
ple. See note 24 above. 
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took the ftrst road towards consistency, ending up with a theory that 
fails to address legal reality adequately, whereas Lon Fuller took the 
second road of trying to do justice to the complexity of reality, ending 
up with an inchoate theory with many ambiguities. 
Is there a way out for proponents of a third theory? I think that the 
only possibility is to accept the incommensurability of the two models 
and defend this fact as such. Within each of the models, separate theo-
ries can be developed as well as possible, but we must always openly 
acknowledge that, then, each of the two theories has fatal problems 
when taken in isolation. Only continuously switching between the two 
models, with all the inconsistencies and ambiguities resulting from such 
switching, may give us the best possible insight in the phenomenon of 
law. In order to understand this continuous switching between the two 
models, we need to focus our attention on the role ideals play as a 
catalyst in this interaction. The focus on ideals also opens a fresh per-
spective on the relation between law and morality. This leads to the 
thesis of the relative autonomy of law, which justifies the claim that the 
interactionist theory can be regarded neither as natural law nor as legal 
positivism and thus constitutes a tlJ.ird theory. 
The interactionist theory does not focus on one model of law, but 
continually switches between two models. It is a combined theory, in 
which two theories continuously interact, without ever reaching the ideal 
of one grand theory. Intellectually, this may not be very satisfying, 
particularly not for authors (including myself) with a strong background 
in analytical philosophy. We will never be able to reach one complete 
and internally coherent theory of law. But this is the price we have to 
pay for doing justice to the complexity of reality. 
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